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Abstract:
Ordered social life requires rules of conduct that help generate and preserve peaceful
and cooperative interactions among individuals. The problem is that these social rules
impose costs. They prohibit us from doing some things we might see as important and
they require us to do other things that we might otherwise not do. The question for
the contractarian is whether the costs of these social rules can be rationally justiﬁed. I
argue that traditional contract theories have tended to underestimate the importance of
evaluating the cost of enforcement and compliance in the contract procedure. In addition,
the social contract has been understood narrowly as a method of justifying speciﬁcally
moral or political rules. I defend a broader version of contractarianism as a justiﬁcatory
model that can be used to evaluate any set of social rules or institutions that impose costs
on agents. In so doing, I argue that contractarianism is a general method of evaluating
and justifying the rules that order the structure of social life.
Keywords: Contractarianism, David Gauthier, John Rawls, Compliance, Conventions,
Folk Theorem, James Buchanan.
“Men want freedom from constraints, while at the same time they
recognize the necessity of order. This paradox of being governed be-
comes more intense as the politicized share in life increases, as the
state takes on more power over personal affairs [...] ‘Ordered anar-
chy’ remains the objective, but ‘ordered’ by whom? Neither the state
nor the savage is noble, and this reality must be squarely faced.”
(Buchanan 2000[1975], xv–xvii)
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1. Introduction
Contractarianism is typically divided into moral and political contractarianism.
The ﬁrst is concerned with justifying moral principles or rules and the second
for authorizing political authority or political principles of justice. Understood
in this way, contractarianism is, as Robert Sugden has described it, a “broad
church” functioning as a means to justify a broad array of social rules or political
institutions (Sugden 2013). As broad as this interpretation of contractarianism
is, however, I want to argue that this understanding of contractarianism is still
too narrow and misses the real power of the contractarian approach. I will de-
fend a version of contractarianism here that is a general approach to justifying
social rules and their related institutional forms.1
The real problem that contractarianism is uniquely situated to solve is the
problem of reconciling individual reasons for action and the constraints of so-
cial rules. The basic normative question for individuals is ‘what should I do?’
This question has two basic answers, one that comes from individual reasons
and one that comes from social rules. Individuals have reasons for action that
come from their own assessment of what will best allow them to achieve their
values, goals, or ends whatever those may be. The basis for these reasons need
not be self-interested and the general problem of contractarianism is to deter-
mine whether a given social rule or set of rules can be justiﬁed to individuals
with a diverse set of individual values and goals. Individual reasons tend to
be teleological and outcome based and have the general form ‘do x in order to
achieve outcome y’ where the outcome is preferred because of the value, goal,
end that it is related to. Reasons from social rules tend to have the form ‘x is
prohibited/allowed/required’ regardless of whether doing the action in question
has any relation to one’s values, goals, or ends. The question is whether, when
these two sources of reasons conﬂict, there is some way to reconcile that conﬂict
so as give effective normative guidance to individual actors.
Contractarianism is an attempt to show that these two sources of reasons for
action (individual and social) are reconciled, insofar as they can be, by justifying
the social rules on the basis of how they help individuals achieve their individual
aims. Put another way, it is an attempt, as Rawls argued, to settle the question
of justiﬁcation “by working out a problem of deliberation” (1999, 16). If individu-
als, from their own points of view and considering their rational values and aims
would or could agree to various social rules or institutions, those institutions or
rules would be rationally justiﬁable. Contractarianism understood this way is
not a method of authorizing general political or moral authority but, instead, a
way of evaluating the rational justiﬁcation of social rules generally.
Using this broad understanding of contractarianism, I will argue that the
contractarian method of justiﬁcation should play an essential role in evaluat-
ing social institutions, even those that arise from a process of social evolution
1 Throughout I will use the term ‘institution’ in a very general way as some set of social rules that
constrain social action. Here I am loosely following the general deﬁnition of institutions used by
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that do not rely on the state. We can accept that social institutions tend to
arise from an evolutionary, path-dependent process of historical development
while still imposing a rational test on those evolved institutions. More impor-
tantly, a general contractarian test can be used to determine the attractiveness
of attempting to move from any given institutional equilibrium to another and
providing reasons for doing so. The social contract can be used as method of
‘ordering anarchy’ of linking the rational and the historical. As such, it has a
natural afﬁnity with the kind of contract theory that Sugden (2013) advocates
and the form of conventional social organization that Anthony De Jasay (1998;
2013) has advocated.
2. The Cost of Rules
All social rules, however beneﬁcial they may ultimately be, have a cost. That
cost has two aspects a) the opportunity cost of forgoing alternatives because of
the social rules in question and b) the cost of enforcing compliance with those
social rules. The ﬁrst we can call the opportunity cost of rules and the second we
can call the enforcement costs. The opportunity cost of a rule is easy to see. If
I am hungry and there is a loaf of bread in a shop window that would alleviate
my hunger, it might seem natural to take the loaf of bread. If, however, there
is a social rule that one must not steal and, assuming that this loaf of bread
belongs to another person or to the shop, the rule will forbid me from taking
the easiest means to achieve my ends. This type of cost is often more subtle
than this example might suggest, however. Imagine a person deeply devoted to
alleviating the suffering of others through giving her time and money to charity
organizations. In a society that taxes income for whatever reason, the social
rules will tell this person to give a certain amount of her income to the state
rather than give that same amount to charity. In this case, the social rule is
telling the person to forgo the pursuit of what she sees as an important value—
alleviating suffering—in order to follow the social rule.
Another example may help to show the multi-faceted and ubiquitous nature
of this cost. In the United States, the Food and Drug Administration has many
rules prohibiting individuals from obtaining potentially life saving or suffering
alleviating drugs and treatments that have not been approved by the FDA, even
for terminal illnesses. To follow these rules is to forgo the beneﬁts that one might
be able to receive or to help other receive in order to comply with the social, in
this case political, rules. The costs of complying with these rules will in many
cases be very onerous indeed. If someone is given the opportunity to save or
prolong their life by using a potentially helpful though unapproved drug, what
could possibly be their reason for following the rule rather than their own rea-
son? This is the general problem that confronts any social rule that constrains
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The second type of cost that social rules impose is the cost of enforcement.
This is the direct cost of setting up and maintaining a mechanism for imposing
sanctions on non-compliers. Formal mechanisms of monitoring and sanctioning
require the establishments of institutions and agents that are speciﬁcally au-
thorized to engage in sanctioning and monitoring. These institutions, be they
public political mechanisms as in the case of police and courts, or private as in
the case of internal monitoring within a ﬁrm or private security, require funding
for their establishment and maintenance. The direct cost in these types of insti-
tutions will be in the form of user fees or, in many cases, taxation. The direct cost
then will tend to be monetary to those who fall under the aegis of these formal
mechanisms of enforcement and monitoring. In the case of informal monitoring
and enforcement the cost will tend to be imposed on the members of the institu-
tion themselves. For instance, a community garden or park may limit access or
restrict use in various ways and rely on the users of that resource to monitor and
sanction non-compliance via access or use rules. These costs will be direct if they
require the members of a club or group to enforce or monitor the rules directly
in the case of informal enforcement and the direct monetary and resource cost of
establishing and maintaining formal enforcement and monitoring mechanisms.
Regardless of the type of cost that various social rules impose, either in terms
of enforcement or the opportunity cost of following the rules, individuals under a
regime of rules will reasonably ask whether those costs are worth paying. In its
most general form, this is the question of the justiﬁcation of those rules. Without
directly introducing questions of authority, coercion, or moral foundations then,
it is possible to raise a justiﬁcatory question with regards to any set of social
rules that impose costs. It is this question of whether the costs of the rules are
worth paying to the individuals who fall under those rules that leads naturally
to a contractarian answer. Contractarian justiﬁcation is a test of whether a
given set of individuals would see the costs of a set of rules as worth paying. As
such, it is a general justiﬁcatory test that is not limited to a particular moral or
political domain.
Contractarianism, at its heart, is a method of justifying social rules be they
moral, political, legal, or conventional. These rules require justiﬁcation insofar
as they claim to make authoritative demands on how one should act. If our social
rules merely restated our rational or prudential reasons for acting, they would
be otiose. Social rules do not, however, merely serve to remind us what action
is the best means for achieving our goals, interests, or values. Instead, they
often constrain or direct the pursuit of our ends and values in ways that often
force us to give up on some of the means or ends that we otherwise would have
pursued. There is a potential (and often actual) conﬂict between the demands
of our social rules and what our individual rationality may tell us is the most
attractive option.
When we live in society we are confronted with two sources of, at least prima
facie, authoritative reasons for action: social rules and individual rationality.
When theses reasons for action conﬂict-as they often will-we need a rational
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a rational justiﬁcation for our social rules to reconcile the demands of our so-
cial rules with our individual rationality. Without a rational justiﬁcation for
the demands of our social rules, they can only be seen as alien impositions on
the rational pursuit of our values and ends. In relation to moral rules, David
Gauthier described the potential disconnect between individual rationality and
social rules as a “foundational crisis”, arguing that the traditional methods of
justifying our social rules are no longer compelling (1991, 15). Our social rules
often ask us to give up on the pursuit of the goals and values that we hold most
dear. Why should we pay the price that the rules demand without an assur-
ance that the rules themselves are rational, that is, are ultimately necessary for
us to live together peacefully under terms of mutual beneﬁt? Contractarianism
attempts to reconcile our social rules and rationality directly by showing that
rational individuals would agree to (at least some) social rules because those
rules are mutually beneﬁcial. We can do better overall by living under certain
social rules and institutions than we could do without them.
3. Endorsement and Compliance
There are a number of complications hidden in the above claim that contractari-
anism aims to justify social rules to those whom they are meant to apply. Surely
not everyone can be expected to come to endorse every social rule, even from
a purely principled point of view. Communists cannot be expected to endorse
many property rules, for instance. At the extreme, the committed anarchist
will likely not see any justiﬁcation for political rules and the committed moral
nihilist or psychopath will not see any principled justiﬁcation for moral rules.
Does the failure to justify social rules to the anarchist or the nihilist sink the
contractarian project?
The problem is a fundamental one. If social rules must be justiﬁed to each
individual from their various points of view because they impose costs, a di-
versity of viewpoints might reduce the potential core of agreement to a null
set. This has led many contractarians to restrict the diversity of their contrac-
tual agents by specifying narrowly the utility functions or preferences of their
agents. Rawls, for instance, reduces the diversity of his contractual agents by
arguing that all individuals in the original position are “equally rational” and
“similarly situated” behind the veil of ignorance so that “we can view the agree-
ment in the original position from the standpoint of one person” (1999, §24,
120)”. Gauthier does not go quite so far in reducing the diversity of his contrac-
tual agents, both in terms of their strategic rationality and what bargains they
are able to accept (1986, 61; 143; Thrasher 2014). John Harsanyi and others
introduce a strong symmetry condition into their agreement procedures that re-
strict the diversity of rational options (Harsanyi 1982, 46–49; 1977, 190). As
I have argued elsewhere, reducing the diversity of possible agreements in the
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tional contractors would agree to, but insofar as doing so introduces constraints
into the contractual deliberation that are not themselves requirements of ratio-
nality, they undermine the entire contractarian approach to justiﬁcation insofar
as that justiﬁcation relies on showing that the costs of social rules are rationally
worth paying (Thrasher 2014).
To rationally evaluate the attractiveness of social rules, individuals must be
able to evaluate the relative cost of those rules versus an alternative and this is
impossible without taking into account both the expected cost and the expected
beneﬁt of those rules. Using a mundane example as an analogy, imagine you
are selecting a bottle of wine for dinner. You are having something that pairs
well with a strong red and your three choices are an excellent vintage French
Bordeaux, a good Australian Shiraz, and a decent California Cabernet. Your
ranking, excluding price or budget is:
Bordeaux
Shiraz
Cabernet
Table 1: Wine Ranking (Excluding Price or Budget)
This ranking reﬂects the overall attractiveness of these options without taking
into account their cost, as well as your ability to pay and your willingness to
pay. Given these assumptions, the rational choice is to select the Bordeaux.
Now imagine we introduce a budget (ability to pay) constraint that rules out the
Bordeaux, but leaves the Shiraz and the Cabernet. Now it looks like the rational
choice is for the Shiraz (assuming contraction consistency). Imagine further
that we now introduce the relative costs of each bottle and your willingness to
pay. The Shiraz is more expensive than the Cabernet, say, and if you choose
the Shiraz you will have to economize elsewhere, for instance, by eliminating a
dessert or glass of port after the meal. This may make the Cabernet the most
attractive option once cost has been included into the decision calculus, even
though it was the least attractive choice when cost was excluded.
The moral of this little oenophillic example is that evaluating the cost as
well as the attractiveness of an option can make a huge difference in which
option it is most rational to select. Though the selection of social rules and the
selection of wine do not share many features, they share this very important
one: cost matters. We need to know the relative trade-offs we will have to make
when selecting one wine or one rule over another to make a truly rational choice.
Because of this, the evaluation of compliance costs must be incorporated into the
contractual choice procedure. This changes, somewhat, both the idea of what the
social contract is doing and how it relates to practice.36 John Thrasher
4. Modeling Justiﬁcation
The original interpretation of the contractarian project is as a deliberative pro-
cedure for showing why rational individuals are justiﬁed in endorsing certain
social rules or principles. The problem of justifying social rules—of showing that
individuals have reason to endorse those rules-is, as Rawls rightly notes, trans-
formed into a problem of deliberation or, more clearly, as a problem of rational
choice (1999, §4, 16). This is what Rawls meant when he wrote that the “theory
of justice is a part, perhaps the most signiﬁcant part, of the theory of rational
choice (1999, §3, 15)”. It would be more precise to say that the problem of justiﬁ-
cation becomes a problem of rational choice in contractarianism, an insight that
Gauthier developed more fully. We are still only concerned with the justiﬁcation
of endorsement; the justiﬁcation of compliance is taken to be an additional issue
that is worked out differently in Rawls and in Gauthier.2
The problem with this approach is, as I suggested in the last section, that
there is good reason to think that rational choice will be impossible, or at least
very error prone, if costs are not weighed in with beneﬁts at the outset. This
raises the question of the appropriate way of introducing the costs of compliance
and enforcement into the choice situation. This is done by thinking of the social
contract as a model of justiﬁcation that takes into account both the costs and
beneﬁts of a given set of rules into account. To see how this would work we need
to understand two things: 1) what does it mean for the social contract to be a
model of justiﬁcation and 2) how do we incorporate costs into that model? I will
look at each question in turn.
As I have already suggested, instead of thinking of the social contract as a
form of hypothetical consent or as a promise, we should see it as a model of
what reasons we have for endorsing and complying with certain social rules.
The goal of contractarianism is not, on this view, to show that each and every
person would consent or promise to endorse and comply with a given set of so-
cial rules. Instead, it is a normative model for what we could rationally agree
to and, hence, what we have reason to endorse and comply with. Given the gen-
eral problem of justifying the costs of social rules to a potentially diverse set of
individuals, it is helpful to think of contractarian justiﬁcation as a model; specif-
ically a model of the reasons that rational individuals would have for endorsing
and complying with particular social rules. Models are indirect representations
2 Rawls addresses this problem in the context of the stability of the well-ordered society governed
by appropriately chosen principles of justice. In Theory, he argues that there will be congruence
between the principles of right chosen in the contract and the principles of good embodied in the
moral psychology of individuals who live in that society. In Political Liberalism, this account
changes substantially and he gives up on this congruence argument (see, e.g., Weithman 2010).
The case of Gauthier is substantially more complicated and relates to assumptions he makes
about both the “translucency” of individuals and the beneﬁts of what he calls “constrained max-
imization” as well as the possibility of individuals living under a justiﬁed contractarian moral
system to become socialized to that system. Buchanan’s contractarian theory, though in some
ways less developed than the one’s presented in Rawls and Gauthier’s work, does take compliance
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of some complex operation or phenomenon. Because of the complexity of targets,
models will often involve some important simpliﬁcations. These simpliﬁcations
or abstractions have a point that is related to the use of the model. For instance,
the Volterra predator-prey model, the Price equation, and Hamilton’s rule are
incredibly simple and abstract models of very complex interactions in biological
populations that, nevertheless, have proven to be useful for theorists and scien-
tists (Weisberg 2007). Similarly, maps may involve signiﬁcant simpliﬁcations or
distortions and still be useful; indeed it is often because of these distortions that
maps are useful. A walking map of the DC mall will be useless if I am attempt-
ing to navigate the DC Metro system and a metro map will be useless if I am
trying walk from the Jefferson Memorial to National Art Gallery. Even though
these two maps represent overlapping parts of the world each has a speciﬁc use.
The social contract, I am arguing, should be understood as a model of jus-
tiﬁcatory reasons. More speciﬁcally, we should think of the social contract as
modeling what reasons rational individuals have to endorse and comply with
certain social rules. The exact form of the model will vary depending on its use.
For instance, a social contract model of reasons for endorsing and complying
with a particular set of political rules in society A may be very different from
a social contract model of coordination norms in society B. This is because the
reasons for endorsing and complying with speciﬁc social rules, whatever other
complexities may be modeled in the social contract, must take into account the
cost of compliance. Of course there will be many other reasons for endorsing or
complying with a set of social rules but those will vary radically depending on
the particular rules in question. Regardless of the speciﬁcs of those rules, how-
ever, individuals will always consider the cost of those rules from their point of
view. Contractarianism is, fundamentally, the project of showing that the cost
of social rules is worth paying. Put another way, the social contract is a device
for testing whether we are better off with our social rules than without them.
Do our social rules aid rather than hinder cooperation? Do they allow us to live
together peacefully or are they tools for oppression? Only if these questions can
be answered can rational contractors be expected to agree to those rules.
The social contract understood as a model of justiﬁcation will have three com-
ponents. First, a model of the diverse set of potential contractors (the members
of the group liable to the rule) more speciﬁcally a speciﬁcation of their basis for
making rational choices—a model of rationality. Second, it will have a delibera-
tive model of choice, that is, how these contractors come to a rational agreement.
In Gauthier’s contract this is a bargaining model, in Rawls and Harsanyi it is a
model of the idealized choice or one suitably situated chooser. Gaus uses a social
choice aggregation model coupled with an evolutionary process (2011). There
are many other possible agreement procedures. Third, the contract model will
have a justiﬁcatory target: what is to be justiﬁed. In contractarian theories of
justice this tends to be principles of justice, but it may also be moral principles,
social rules, or even lower level institutional rules. In any case, the link be-
tween the reasons of the contractors and the reasons of actual people must be
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kind of normative force for actual people in real institutions. They must see the
reasons of the contractors as reﬂecting their reasons.
It is not my purpose here to give a complete contract theory so I will leave
the question open about how exactly to model the contractors and the agreement
procedure. My concern is to show that since the justiﬁcation of the social rules is
related to the cost those rules impose, we must also take into account the cost of
complying with and enforcing those rules when the contractors evaluate them.
Otherwise, we cannot be sure that the reasons of the contractors in the model
will reﬂect the reasons of actual people outside the model.
As I have argued, endorsement of social rules and compliance with those
same rules is conceptually distinct. There may be a reason for an individual to
rationally endorse a social rule but there may also be a reason for that same indi-
vidual to evade complying with that rule in a particular case. Hobbes’s fool and
Hume’s sensible knave are classic cases where an individual might prefer there
to be certain rules that everyone else obeys while seeing the beneﬁt of not obey-
ing those rules when there is a beneﬁt to doing so. Gaus (2011, pt. II) has argued
that this kind of non-compliance problem is a fatal one to the traditional project
of rational choice contractarianism. The problem may be even worse than Gaus,
Hobbes, and Hume thought, however. As David Rose has argued, there are of-
ten possibilities of opportunism that amount to non-compliance in grey areas
where the agent has specialized information that those monitoring compliance
will necessarily lack (2011, 34–36). In any case, any account of contractarian
justiﬁcation must be able to do two things: 1) show that rational individuals
would have reason to endorse a set of social rules X and 2) show that rational
individuals would have reason to comply with the rules in X in particular cases.
That is, contractual justiﬁcation must show that endorsement of the rules and
compliance with the rules is worth the cost.
To fuse the rationality of compliance and endorsement in the contract we
need to introduce a way to model the cost of the rules into the decision calculus
of the agents in the contract. One basic way to do this is to model the rules in
question as a bundle of goods, analogous to microeconomic theory. Individuals
come to the choice or agreement procedure with a utility function that is a rep-
resentation of their ranking of those goods as well as as ‘budget’ for how much
they are able to pay for those goods. In the case of social rules this would be how
much they are able to pay for the compliance and enforcement of those social
rules. The ability to pay is a representation of what they would have to give up
in order to select those particular rules and this budget represents the limit of
what they are willing to give up for the beneﬁt of the rule. Put another way, any
rule that falls above their budget line represents a net cost rather than a net
beneﬁt. As such it would be irrational for them to select such a rule. In addition
to their ‘ability to pay’ for a given rule there is also their ‘willingness to pay’ for a
rule. This will typically be higher than their budget line (though it need not be)
and will often reﬂect the relative value they place on the status quo rules versus
a proposed alternative. Once we introduce willingness and ability to pay con-
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in the same way that in the last section the relative attractiveness of Cabernet
changed substantially once a budget and willingness to pay were introduced.
For the evaluation of compliance costs to be modeled properly and to be ra-
tionally evaluated, however, we need to understand the relationship between
the proposed rules or institutions being evaluated in the contract model and the
value attached to them by the contractors. Thinking of the rules as a bundle
of goods is a simpliﬁcation that hides an important complication in this model.
Goods are, in economic theory, assumed to be directly consumed or used as in-
termediate products to achieve some end, that is, they are ranked on the basis
of the outcomes they are expected to produce for the individuals involved. This
is true of social rules, but in a more complex way. In addition, part of the cost
of the social rules as well as their expected beneﬁts depends on the particular
enforcement mechanism associated with them.
5. Outcomes, Rules, and Enforcement
The traditional model of rationality used in contractarian theory assumes that
individuals choose rules or principles because they see them as the most effec-
tive expected prospect to their higher ranked outcome states. In many, if not
most cases, choices are made under risk or uncertainty. In cases of risk, indi-
viduals know or can roughly assess the probability that their possible actions
will lead to particular outcomes. The classic example is the risk of making a
particular gamble, say in a game of roulette. For example, the expected value of
betting one dollar on red in an American roulette table is -$.053 given the payoff
odds. There are important questions of what it means to know the probability of
a given prospect in different interpretations of probability, but the idea is that
in situations of risk actions are gambles with an expected prospect to a partic-
ular outcome or set of outcomes. Under uncertainty the situation is different,
it is impossible to accurately know what the probability of a prospect leading
to a particular outcome is with very much warrant. According to Frank Knight
(1921), uncertainty characterizes many of the economic situations we ﬁnd our-
selves in, especially entrepreneurial situations.
The relevance of this discussion to the social contract is that, as James Bu-
chanan and Geoffrey Brennan (2000[1985], 33–36) have pointed out, the selec-
tion of social rules by contractors occurs under conditions of uncertainty rather
than risk. This is the case for two reasons. First, social rules typically cover a set
of actions that is temporally extended, often indeﬁnitely. One may have a strong
sense that he will beneﬁt from rule X this month or this year, but he may be less
certain that he will beneﬁt after that. Political constitutional rules often work
this way. A particular supermajority rule, for instance the ﬁlibuster rule in the
American senate, may seem beneﬁcial to the party in the minority, but once they
are in the majority they will realize the rule can be used against them. As such,
the rule must be evaluated for how it will be expected to work in the long-term40 John Thrasher
and not merely in cases at hand. Second, social rules will often cover a variety
of different cases and it will be impossible for individuals to predict with any
degree of accuracy the exact effect the rules will have on them. They will only
be able to predict the general tendencies of such rules. These two features of
social rules that lead to uncertainty in choice are what Buchanan and Brennan
call the “permanence” and “generality” of the rules (2000[1985], 34). Of course,
permanence is not usually actual permanence, but rather uncertainty about the
temporal extension of the rule. The same is true of generality.
This doesn’t make rational choice impossible over rules but it does put the
contractors under a “veil of uncertainty” (Buchanan and Brennan 2000[1985],
35). Contractors will be uncertain about how the rules will affect them directly,
although they will reasonably be able to evaluate the general tendency of rules
to beneﬁt or hurt them. As Buchanan and Brennan note, this uncertainty will
tend to make agreement more rather than less likely the more general the rules
tend to be. Individuals choosers, whatever their particular differences, will be
driven to take a general point of view when they evaluate the rules in question.
All of this will be familiar to those acquainted with Buchanan style consti-
tutional political economy. The additional question posed by the introduction of
costs into the contractual procedure here is how individuals are meant to eval-
uate the compliance costs of the rules and the costs of enforcement mechanisms
given that there will be signiﬁcant uncertainty regarding the costs as well as
the beneﬁts of various rules.
Given this uncertainty, we can think of the contractual model as having two
basic justiﬁcatory functions, evaluative and authorizing. The evaluative func-
tion acts to show individuals what rules it is rational to endorse and comply
with and the authorizing function is to authorize the appropriate enforcement
mechanism to stabilize the rules that are chosen. All stable social institutions
require some form of enforcement to reduce the incentive of non-compliance.
Some conventional institutions can rely on endogenous enforcement, while other
institutions must rely on exogenous enforcement to achieve stability. Contrac-
tarian theory has tended to focus on the authorization of exogenous enforcement
of contracts and social rules, but all enforcement, insofar as it imposes costs on
non-compliers, requires authorization and justiﬁcation. In a society understood
as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage the proper justiﬁcatory basis for
the social rules and their enforcement is mutual beneﬁt. This is the kind of justi-
ﬁcation that contractarianism provides. The model of contractarian justiﬁcation
aims to show that a set of social rules or institution is a) mutually advantageous
to those who are expected to comply with the social rules and b) is a stable in-
stitutional equilibrium. All institutions and social rules, whether they rely on
exogenous enforcement or not, should meet these two contractarian standards.
The distinction between endogenous and exogenous enforcement is crucial
and is key to the authorizing element of the contractarian model. I will dis-
cuss the distinction in more detail in the next section. The point here is that
whichever form of enforcement mechanism is appropriate, since it imposes costs
on those to whom it applies it will require rational justiﬁcation. This is the cru-Ordering Anarchy 41
cial role that contractarianism understood as a justiﬁcatory model plays in any
social system governed by social rules. It is irrelevant whether those rules are
‘grown’ conventional rules or ‘made’ rules. In either case, insofar as they impose
compliance and enforcement costs, they require rational justiﬁcation and the
only plausible way that they can be justiﬁed to a society of diverse individuals
with different and often conﬂicting goals, values, and ends is through a contrac-
tarian justiﬁcatory process. The choice of an endogenous versus an exogenous
enforcement mechanism for the enforcement of the rules we have reason to en-
dorse is a crucial one, but it can only be decided along roughly contractarian
lines.
6. Making and Buying Enforcement
The discussion so far has been leading to the crucial question at the heart of
the debate between the non-contractarian conventionalist and the contractar-
ian, namely whether there is any role for a contractarian justiﬁcatory procedure
in a system of conventionally evolved social rules. I have been arguing that
there is, that any system of social rules whether it is an evolved set of norms or
a made set of rules requires rational justiﬁcation insofar as it imposes costs on
non-compliers and requires enforcement. This is not a moral requirement. We
do not owe each other a general justiﬁcation of our actions. If we did, this would
make us, as David Gauthier (2003) has argued, into a society of moral debtors.
Instead, the requirement for justiﬁcation is a rational and practical one. So-
cial rules are not simple, direct outgrowths of our individual goals and values.
Acting in accordance with social rules must, to be rationally justiﬁed, beneﬁt
us on the whole but the rules themselves are not simple rules of thumb or gen-
eralizations of individual best practices. Rules constrain our ends and means
and compliance with these constraints has a cost. It is this cost that requires
justiﬁcation.
This is, however, to speak in the abstract. In particular cases compliance
costs are applied through enforcement, i.e. monitoring and sanctioning. To
live under a system of social rules is to be liable to various sanctions for non-
compliance. In some cases the monitoring and sanctioning is done internally
and personally. In the case of many moral and religious rules, for instance, it
is the agent who monitors and sanctions his or herself directly in the form of
guilt and regret. When rules have been fully internalized, this is a powerful
form of enforcement. Many people are haunted by forms of religious guilt years
after they have stopped believing the doctrine to which the guilt was originally
attached. As powerful as this enforcement mechanism is, however, it has two
main problems. First, it is private and idiosyncratic. Guilt relies on the be-
liefs and affects associated with those beliefs that have been internalized over
time. What rule breaking causes guilt in particular people varies based on their
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society composed of people with very different individual belief systems, there
will be substantial variance in what kinds of rule breaking triggers guilt. Both
the rules and the experience of guilt is typically private and not suitable for en-
forcing compliance on a broad array of social rules, many of which may not have
been deeply internalized. Guilt is different from shame in this way, which is
a more public social enforcement mechanism.3 Associated with this is a larger
problem that guilt can become unmoored from the rules with which it was ini-
tially associated and can become ‘free-ﬂoating’.4 This is true of other emotions
like anxiety and love, but is particularly important in the case of guilt. One
may feel guilty for something they believed they have done that is wrong or for
things that seemingly have no signiﬁcance. More to the point for our purposes,
they may feel extreme guilt at breaking ‘taboos’ or rules that cannot be justiﬁed
on reﬂection.5
Second, guilt comes in variable strengths. Some may ﬁnd the guilt associated
with breaking even seemingly trivial rules unbearable, while others may feel
very little guilt when breaking very important rules. The judge and jury that
dole out the penalty of guilt are ﬁckle and operate on principles that are largely
hidden. While a sense of guilt is essential to creating a stable system of rules
when monitoring will always be imperfect and enforcement uneven, it cannot do
the job on its own. Something more is needed.
The ﬂaws with the personal, private enforcement that guilt generates can
and must be supplemented with a public, uniform system of monitoring and
sanctioning for non-compliance. This does not, however, create a necessary jus-
tiﬁcation for a political or state based mechanism of enforcement. Contractari-
anism is a theory of how social rules can be rationally justiﬁed on the basis of
the mutual advantage of individuals who live under those rules. As I have em-
phasized though, an important component of whether it is rational to endorse a
particular set of rules is the compliance costs associated with those rules. The
type of enforcement will matter to the contractors and some forms of enforce-
ment will be more effective and, in the sense I have been discussing it, cheaper
than others. Some enforcement mechanisms can be implemented by the mem-
bers of social institutions, others will require the development of a mechanism
that is solely or largely responsible for enforcement. We can distinguish these
two types of enforcement, respectively, as endogenous and exogenous enforce-
ment mechanisms.
Endogenous enforcement mechanisms rely on those who live under a par-
ticular social rule or institution to monitor and sanction non-compliers directly.
Human society arose out of Pleistocene hunter and gatherer bands and in these
small societies all of the members of the group do the monitoring and sanction-
ing (Boehm 1999). There is no king or chief responsible for adjudicating disputes
3 On this difference between shame and guilt and its importance in society see: Dodds (2004,
chap. 2); Williams (2008, 63–66, passim).
4 For a general discussion of ‘free-ﬂoating’ emotions and their signiﬁcance see Gaus (1990, 59–60).
5 Kurt Baier (1954) makes much of the important difference between ‘taboos’ and justiﬁable social
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or imposing sanctions, the group as a whole is responsible for this task. In more
modern societies, Elinor Ostrom, Cristina Bicchieri, and many other recent theo-
rists have shown that many social rules similarly rely on group level monitoring
and sanctioning for their stability (see, e.g., Bicchieri and Chavez 2010; Bic-
chieri and Xiao 2009; Bicchieri 2002; Ostrom and Gardner 2000; Ostrom 1990;
Schwab and Ostrom 2008). Ostrom and her collaborators have, in particular,
described how informal, non-political rules can arise to manage what she calls
“common pool resources”, public goods that are rivalrous but where exclusion
is costly (Ostrom 1990). The tendency with these types of resources is towards
overconsumption and overuse. She has shown that in many of these cases, in-
formal rules can arise to manage use of the resource. In general, the so-called
folk theorem in game theory shows that in many cases of repeated interactions
between individuals the threat of the withdrawal of cooperation in cases of non-
compliance can be a powerful sanction to stabilize cooperative norms and rules.6
As in most things, though, context matters and there are limits to the cir-
cumstances under which endogenous enforcement can work. Monitoring costs
must be relatively low and information about non-compliance must tend to be
reasonably accurate and easy to acquire. Without this, rules stabilized by en-
dogenous enforcement can easily break down (Vanderschraaf 2007; 2010). The
question becomes, in these types of cases, what the most effective enforcement
mechanism will be. This question can be put, in the language of the theory
of the ﬁrm, of whether to ‘make’ or ‘buy’ enforcement (see, e.g., Coase 1937;
Williamson 1981). Following Coase and Williamson, the answer to this ques-
tion will hinge on the relative transactions costs of each option. We can think of
making enforcement as endogenous enforcement where members of the group do
monitoring and enforcement and each member of the group has a roughly equal
ability and need to monitor and sanction. Buying enforcement, in this context, is
establishing an exogenous agent responsible for monitoring and sanctioning en-
forcement. The transactions costs are the monitoring and enforcement costs as
well as the cost associated with ineffective monitoring and uneven enforcement.
In some cases it will make sense to organize interaction under the aegis of an
external enforcement mechanism to reduce monitoring and enforcement costs in
the same way that it makes sense in the market to move from direct bilateral
contractual exchange to exchange within the ﬁrm. The contractarian test of mu-
tual beneﬁt and cost can be used to evaluate the rationality of organizing an
institution with either form of enforcement mechanism. The choice, though, will
be one of relative costs and beneﬁts to the individuals involved and will be spe-
ciﬁc to the particular institutional and environmental setting. It is unlikely that
there will be one form of monitoring and enforcement that will be appropriate
for all institutions in a given society. This point leads us to a change in emphasis
in contractarian thought.
6 For limits to the application of the folk-theorem as a model for the development of human co-
operation see Bowles and Gintis (2011, chap. 5). Kim Sterelny (2012) doubts that modeling the
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7. Ordering Anarchy
In the previous sections, I have argued that contractarianism is, at its heart,
a method of providing rational justiﬁcation for endorsing and complying with
social rules. I argued that traditional contractarian theories put too much em-
phasis on the justiﬁcation of the social rules themselves and too little emphasis
on thinking about the role that enforcement plays in stabilizing those rules.
Speciﬁcally, the cost and the form of enforcement are underemphasized. I have
argued that the cost of compliance should be included in the initial contractual
model and that mechanisms for stabilizing compliance need to be justiﬁed in
that model as well. Individuals may choose to ‘make’ or ‘buy’ their enforcement
based on which method is most effective at securing compliance to rationally
justiﬁed social rules at the lowest cost to the individuals involved.
The question naturally arises, at this point, of what form a contractarian
society would take. I think the answer to this question is largely open. Con-
tractarianism is a justiﬁcatory theory based on several premises. One is that
social rules need to be justiﬁed to individuals since they are the ones who must
rationally agree to endorse and comply with the social rules. Another is that
rational individuals would only agree to rules that they see as making them
better rather than worse off. This leads to an assumption that any set of rules
that can be rationally agreed to by a set of individuals will be, as a condition
of agreement, mutually beneﬁcial and Pareto superior to any alternative set of
rules. The broad vision of a contractarian society is one based on the underlying
idea that individuals have their own lives to lead and that, suitably organized,
social life will allow them to pursue their collective and individual goals more
effectively. Beyond that, though, there is very little the contractarian can say
about the speciﬁc form a contractarian society would take, without being much
more speciﬁc about the people that would make up that society.
One implication of this is that a contractarian society need not be either a
statist one (relying primarily on exogenous enforcement) or an anarchist one
(relying primarily on endogenous enforcement). It may be either or something
else entirely. Considering the diversity of individuals in modern societies and
differences in problems that social rules are erected to solve, it seems most likely
that it will be a mix of both. What will determine the precise nature of this mix
of endogenous and exogenous enforcement will partly have to do with the insti-
tutional history of the society in question. The contractarian test can be used
to evaluate the relative attractiveness of one set of social rules and enforce-
ment over another, but these tests will tend to be comparative and binary. Is
institution X better (along contractarian lines) than institutions Y? Pareto im-
provements will be made at each node but the process as a whole will be path-
dependent and there is no reason to assume that two similar societies, even
starting from the same social rules, would converge on the same set of social
rules at a time in the future. A contractarian society will be shaped by history
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James Buchanan argued that “anarchy is an ideal for ideal men; passionate
men must be reasonable (Buchanan 2000[1975], xv)”. Being reasonable, how-
ever, does not mean that all order must be imposed from on high. Our social
rules shape our engagement with one another. The goal is to create and main-
tain the rules that allow us to order the anarchy of the human and natural world
around us for our beneﬁt. They are tools that we can use to better or circum-
stances or to worsen them. The idea of the social contract is a framework for
ordering anarchy for mutual beneﬁt and peace. It takes humans as they are and
helps them evaluate institutions as they might be. As such it is a general tool
for evaluating all forms of social rules, however they are enforced.
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